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Summary 
On October 4, 1992, a Boeing 747-200F freighter airplane lost its right wing engines after 
departing from Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. Due to severe performance and controllability 
problems caused by this the aircraft crashed, 13 km east of the airport, in the Bijlmermeer, a 
suburb of Amsterdam. In recent years, several similar incidents have occurred in which aircraft 
were successfully recovered after encountering a separation of one or more of the engines. This 
report presents an overview of an independent analysis of the accident and applied modelling 
and simulation techniques. The investigation, including the development of the software for the 
accident analysis, was performed at the Division of Flight Control and Simulation of the Faculty 
of Aerospace Engineering of the Delft University of Technology in 1997. Utilising simulation 
and visualisation techniques, a reconstruction of the flight was performed using the parameters 
of the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR). The reconstruction method, referred to as Flight 
Data Reconstruction and Simulation (FDRS), allowed an accurate estimation of the flying 
capabilities of the accident aircraft after the separation of the engines. Apart from providing the 
results of the accident analysis, the aim of the report is to demonstrate the application of 
modelling and simulation techniques as a practical tool for reconstruction and evaluation of 
vehicle dynamics and system characteristics under degraded (failure mode) conditions when 
appropriate operational data is available. For specific applications, the presented reconstruction 
and simulation techniques may be modified or developed further. The analysis, as presented in 
this report, indicated that from a technical point of view the accident aircraft was recoverable 
despite the severe performance and controllability problems caused by the separated engines. 
For future research on advanced avionics/ flight systems design, the reconstructed model 
resulting from the analysis can be utilised as a benchmark to evaluate flight control concepts on 
their performance to accommodate in-flight failures. 
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Nomenclature 
CL  lift coefficient 
CNe  yawing moment coefficient due to thrust asymmetry 
CN yawing moment coefficient due to sideslip 
CY side force coefficient due to sideslip 
CYdelta_r  side force coefficient due to rudder deflection 
CD drag coefficient due to wing damage 
CL lift coefficient due to wing damage 
c.g. center of gravity 
Ycg lateral distance of c.g. from aircraft centerline 
lv rudder side force moment arm 
Tn engine thrust 
V true airspeed 
 sideslip angle 
delta_r rudder deflection 
 bank angle 
 
 
Abbreviations 
ATC   Air Traffic Control 
CAD   Computer Assisted Design 
DASMAT Delft University Aircraft Simulation and Analysis Tool 
DFDR  Digital Flight Data Recorder 
DUT   Delft University of Technology 
FDRS   Flight Data Reconstruction and Simulation 
EGT   Exhaust Gas Temperature 
EPR   Engine Pressure Ratio 
GA   Go Around 
IAS   Indicated Airspeed 
ICAO   International Civil Aviation Organisation 
MCT   Maximum Continuous Thrust 
NLR   National Aerospace Laboratory 
TOGA  Take Off/Go Around 
UTC   Universal Time Co-ordinated 
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1 Introduction 
On October 4, 1992, a Boeing 747-200F freighter went down near Amsterdam Schiphol Airport 
after an encounter of a multiple right wing engine separation. In an attempt to return to the 
airport for an emergency landing, the aircraft flew several right-hand circuits in order to lose 
altitude and to line up with the requested runway. During the second line-up, the crew 
apparently lost control of the aircraft. As a result, the aircraft crashed, 13 km east of the airport, 
into an eleven-floor apartment building in the Bijlmermeer, a suburb of Amsterdam. Following 
the accident, an investigation was initiated by several departments and authorities. The 
Netherlands Accident Investigation Bureau, charged with the investigation, was assisted by 
specialists from the Aeronautical Inspection Directorate of the Department of Civil Aviation
1
. 
According to the procedures contained in International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
Annex 13, accredited representatives and their advisors from several countries joined the 
investigation. As far as the technical aspects of the flight were concerned, NLR, the National 
Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands, was tasked with several projects. The aircraft 
manufacturer performed an analysis of the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) of the flight 
and examined its results by means of piloted simulations
2
. The results of the investigation, 
however, were hampered by the fact that the actual extent of structural damage to the right wing 
was unknown. Although the controllability aspects could be reproduced within reasonable 
tolerances in the simulator, the performance aspects showed discrepancies. Especially the last 
minutes of the flight, and the subsequent loss of control, raised questions that were solved 
relying on the data of the DFDR. The origin of several anomalies in the flight control system, 
contributing adversely to the control of the aircraft, remained yet unknown. The analysis 
concluded that given the performance and controllability of the aircraft after the separation of 
the engines a successful landing was highly improbable
1
. 
In 1997, the Division of Flight Control and Simulation of the Faculty of Aerospace Engineering 
of the Delft University of Technology (DUT) in the Netherlands performed an independent 
analysis of the accident
3
. The analysis applied modeling, simulation and visualisation 
techniques for a reconstruction of the flight mechanics of the aircraft using the DFDR pilot 
control inputs. DFDR data for the analysis was obtained from NLR and the Netherlands 
Aviation Safety Board
4
. The purpose of the analysis was to acquire an accurate estimate of the 
actual flying capabilities of the aircraft and to study alternative flight control strategies for a 
successful recovery.  
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2 Overview of the analysis 
The analysis of the accident flight was performed using a Flight Data Reconstruction and 
Simulation (FDRS) method that applies the DFDR pilot control inputs to a detailed simulation 
model of the aircraft and flight control system. A model validation method using inverse 
simulation was used to obtain a best match of DFDR measurements and simulation. In this 
approach, the simulation model virtually ‘flies’ the accident profile, according to the pilot’s 
control inputs, thereby reconstructing missing flight data and any fault events that led to the loss 
of the aircraft. The simulation environment, developed for the analysis, enabled to assess the 
flight mechanics and control effects by means of visualisation. Using the reconstructed model, 
failure mode and effect analysis was applied to the flight control system to investigate a 
degradation of the aircraft’s rudder capabilities that was observed on the DFDR. The 
reconstruction method proved to be a practical tool for estimating the aerodynamic and overall 
flight mechanics effects of engine separation. Visualisation facilitated comparison with the 
DFDR data. The actual flying capabilities of the impaired aircraft were next investigated by 
applying alternative control strategies to the reconstructed model. 
The reconstruction method applied during the analysis resulted in a simulation model of the 
impaired aircraft that matched reasonably well with the performance and controllability effects 
as recorded on the DFDR. The introduction of control loss could be visualised in detail using 
additional flight mechanical parameters. In this way the applied control inputs during the last 
flight stage could be analysed in addition to other flight mechanical aspects. Failure mode and 
effect analysis gave more insight into the performance of the flight control system before and 
after the separation of the engines. The actual flying capabilities of the aircraft to perform an 
approach and landing were examined using the reconstructed model and predefined control 
strategies. Results of the reconstruction were also used during a Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry on 
the accident in 1999 to substantiate additional data on the aircraft’s flight path5.  
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3 Sequence of events 
The accident aircraft was scheduled for a flight 
to Ben Gurion International Airport, Tel Aviv, 
with an intermediate stop at Amsterdam 
Schiphol Airport after a flight from John F. 
Kennedy International Airport, New York. The 
aircraft received an air traffic control slot time of 
17:20 (UTC) for departure. The aircraft was 
refueled with 72 metric tons of Jet A1 fuel and 
was loaded with a total of 114.7 metric tons of  
cargo. The takeoff gross weight was  
determined to be 338.3 metric tons. 
 
At the time of departure, the preferential runways consisted of runway 01L (Zwanenburgbaan) 
for takeoff and 06 (Kaagbaan) for landing. The aircraft was cleared for push back at 17:04 and 
taxied out at 17:14. The first officer was assigned as the pilot flying (PF). The takeoff from 
runway 01L was started at 17:21, and the aircraft was cleared by ATC for the Pampus departure. 
At 17:27.30, while climbing through an altitude of about 6,500 feet, the aircraft encountered a 
separation of the engines no. 3 and 4. The captain took control of the aircraft. Following engine 
separation, the emergency call “mayday, mayday, mayday, we have an emergency”, was 
transmitted by the co-pilot. The aircraft started a right turn to return to the airport for an 
emergency landing. According to eyewitnesses, dumping of the onboard fuel started 
immediately. Amsterdam Radar confirmed the emergency call and directed the flight during the 
emergency procedure. After the crew acknowledged their intentions, they were instructed to 
turn to heading 260.  
 
At 17:28.17, the crew reported a fire on engine no. 
3 and they indicated a loss of thrust on both engines 
3 and 4. At 17:28.57, the aircraft was informed that 
the main runway for landing was runway 06. The 
wind at that time was 040

 at 21 knots. The crew of 
the flight, however, requested the use of runway 27 
for landing. Because the aircraft was only 7 miles 
from the airport at an altitude of 5,000 feet, a 
straight-in approach would not be possible. ATC 
instructed the crew to a heading of 360 degrees to 
fly a circuit and to descend to 2,000 feet. By then the wind was 050
 
 at 22 knots. 
 
Fig. 2: The accident aircraft returning to the airport after 
separation of the no. 3 and 4 engines 
Fig. 1: The accident aircraft landing at Amsterdam 
Schiphol Airport on October 4, 1992 (Studio LCP) 
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At 17:31.17, the crew indicated that they needed 
“12 miles final for landing”. During the 
transmission of this reply, the crew commenced 
the selection of flaps 1 for landing. While 
instructed to turn right to heading 100 the crew 
reported “no. 3 and 4 are out and we have 
problems with the flaps”. After the aircraft was 
established on heading 120, the crew maintained 
an indicated airspeed of 260 knots and a gradual 
descent. ATC cleared the flight for approach and 
instructed a heading of 270 to intercept the final 
approach course. Indicated airspeed remained at 260 knots at an altitude of 4,000 feet. After the 
heading instruction from ATC, it took about thirty seconds before the heading change was 
actually performed. When it became clear that the aircraft was going to overshoot the runway 
centerline, ATC instructed the flight to turn further to heading 290 to intercept the localizer 
from the south. Twenty seconds later a new heading of 310 was instructed by ATC, along with 
the clearance to descent to 1,500 feet. 
 
At 17:35.03, the crew acknowledged the clearance 
by reporting “…1500… and we have a controlling 
problem…”. At this point, indicated airspeed 
decreased to 256 knots. The crew was losing flight 
control and approximately 25 seconds later the 
captain called, “going down 1862, going down…”. 
During this transmission, the crew was trying to 
recover the aircraft by raising the flaps and by 
lowering the gear. The stick shaker and ground 
proximity warning system were audible in the 
background of the transmission. The remaining 
engines no. 1 and 2 were set at maximum thrust. 
 
At 17:35.42, the aircraft impacted at a roll angle of approximately 104

, a load factor of about 
2.5 g’s and approximately 70 pitch down. 
 
 
 
Fig.3: Flight path of the accident aircraft 
 
 
Fig. 4: Impact area of the accident aircraft 
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4 Analysis of the flight 
4.1 Control capabilities 
Under nominal conditions in the case of a failure of both right wing engines without separation, 
aircraft should have the capability to turn in either direction with adequate control authority. 
The accident aircraft was designed to have enough rudder authority to keep the control wheel 
almost neutral with two engines inoperative on one side. This flight condition can be maintained 
up to the remaining engines set at maximum continuous thrust (MCT/EPR 1.35) while at 
maneuvering speed. For the case of the accident aircraft, the DFDR indicates that control wheel 
deflections between 20 to 60 degrees to the left were needed for lateral control and straight 
flight (figure 5). The largest deflection of approximately 60 degrees was required for straight 
and almost level flight. This condition could only be maintained at full rudder pedal and at high 
thrust (EPR#1 1.56 / EPR#2 1.45).  
According to the DFDR, maximum available rudder was needed during the straight legs to 
counteract the yawing moment. The traces of the rudder control surface activity as a response to 
the rudder pedal inputs can be seen in figure 6. In this figure, a limited control authority of the 
lower rudder is visible. From the DFDR it can be determined that lagging of the lower rudder 
started after the first turn, approximately 100 seconds after engine separation and at full left 
pedal (engine separation occurring at t=378 s). Pedal relaxation during turn initiations caused 
the lower rudder to follow the upper rudder again. At final loss of control and increasing roll 
angle, the DFDR shows a sudden increase of lower rudder deflection while the upper rudder 
stays behind at a smaller deflection.  
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Fig. 5: DFDR control wheel deflections 
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Fig. 6: DFDR rudder surface deflections 
The DFDR indicates (figure 7) that the controllability and performance condition after engine 
separation required engine no. 1 and 2 thrust settings between approximately MCT (EPR 1.3) 
and overboost thrust (EPR 1.62). High thrust (EPR#1 1.56/ EPR#2 1.45) is needed to sustain 
almost straight and level flight. This condition is reached approximately 120 seconds after 
separation of the engines and after completion of the first turn towards a heading north. 
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In general, the DFDR indicates that both pedal 
and control wheel were used for turn initiation 
and roll control. The first turn after the separation 
of the engines no. 3 and 4 is performed at almost 
zero pedal deflection. At final control loss, 
control wheel deflection is maximum while 
rudder pedal deflection is less than maximum.  
An analysis of the flight in a flight simulator
2
 
indicated that in the above mentioned conditions 
and with maximum rudder pedal input, 
approximately 30 degrees left control wheel 
deflection was needed to maintain straight flight. This condition was simulated with trailing 
edge flaps up. According to the hydraulic system architecture, this condition locks the outboard 
ailerons when outboard flaps are not selected. For the case of the accident flight, the additional 
wing damage and degraded effectiveness of the right wing inboard aileron required larger left 
wing down control wheel deflections than in the nominal case. This effect can be determined 
from the DFDR and was confirmed by reconstruction of the flight. 
 
The above analysis taken into account, it is clear that the crew of the aircraft was confronted 
with a flight condition that was different from a nominal two engine out situation. For the heavy 
aircraft configuration at a relative low speed of 260 knots IAS, the DFDR indicates that flight 
control was almost lost at full pedal, 60 to 70% of maximum lateral control and at high thrust. 
 
4.2 Performance capabilities 
An energy analysis of the flight using the DFDR data
6  
indicated that after the separation of the 
engines the aircraft had level flight capability at go-around thrust (GA)
 
and at an airspeed (IAS) 
of approximately 270 knots. Maneuvering capabilities were marginal and resulted into a loss of 
altitude. A normal load of approximately 1.1 g, equivalent to 25 degrees of bank, reduced the 
maximum climb capability to approximately minus 400 feet/min. At MCT thrust and at 
approximately 270 knots IAS, maximum climb performance was about minus 350 feet/min. 
Below 260 knots IAS, a normal load of 1.15 g and an angle of attack above approximately 8 
degrees, resulted in a significant performance degradation. At 256 knots IAS, a normal load of 
1.2 g and MCT thrust, maximum climb performance was reduced to minus 2000 feet/min. This 
effect, and the associated loss of altitude, was not predicted correctly by simulation models in 
foregoing analyses
2, 6
. 
Fig. 7: DFDR engine no. 1 and 2 thrust settings 
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5 Flight data reconstruction and simulation 
In contrast to the foregoing analysis of the accident flight relying on the data of the DFDR, an 
analysis was performed utilising flight data reconstruction and simulation techniques. In this 
approach, the DFDR parameters were reconstructed by applying the DFDR pilot control inputs 
to an extensive simulation model of the accident aircraft. In particular, the following issues were 
covered in detail by the analysis: 
 
 Reconstruction of the flight data to review the flight from initial climb to the final flight 
stage 
 Flight path reconstruction 
 Available control margins during the flight 
 Applied control inputs 
 Flight control and aerodynamic contributions to the loss of control 
 Initial climb performance 
 Rudder control system performance and effect on controllability 
 Flight control capabilities 
 Control loss recovery capabilities 
 Maneuvering capabilities 
 Approach and landing capabilities 
 
5.1 Flight control and performance 
 
5.1.1 Controllability 
The first notice on an engine failure will be a sudden yaw of the aircraft. If directional control is 
not applied, or with a fixed rudder deflection, thrust asymmetry will cause the aircraft to slip 
and to roll. The negative sideslip angle will create a positive rolling moment (right wing down). 
Instant control compensation in an engine out condition may consist of: 
 
 A rudder pedal input to counteract the yawing moment 
 A control wheel deflection to counteract the rolling moment 
 Applying a thrust reduction on the remaining engines to stop the yaw 
 
Aircraft maneuvering in this flight condition has a direct result on the remaining control and 
performance capabilities of the aircraft. Turning into the direction of the remaining engines 
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(dead engine high) creates a flight condition with more lateral margin. Bank steepening in both 
turn directions will cause the available performance margins to decrease.  
Structural damage to the wing due a separation of the engine causes an additional lift loss and 
drag increase on the wing. Because these effects are a function of angle of attack, increase of 
angle of attack will create an additional rolling moment and yawing moment into the direction 
of the separated engine. This will require more opposite control wheel deflection, especially to 
counteract bank steepening during maneuvering. 
 
For steady flight in the above mentioned conditions, the aircraft can be flown by: 
 
 Reducing roll angle to zero, or 
 Reducing sideslip angle to zero 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the aircraft condition for stationary and straight flight at zero roll angle under 
the conditions of the accident aircraft. In wings level flight a positive sideslip angle is required 
for straight flight to compensate the lateral force in the vertical tailplane. This condition 
decreases the available performance of the aircraft due to the additional drag of the sideslip. 
However, more lateral control margin is created due to the contribution of the increasing 
negative rolling moment due to sideslip. 
 
Fig. 8: Straight and stationary flight with  Fig. 9: Straight and stationary flight with 
right wing engine separation at zero roll angle  right wing engine separation at zero sideslip angle 
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Straight and stationary flight at zero sideslip angle with a separation of the right wing engines is 
illustrated in figure 9. This condition actually improves the available performance of the aircraft 
as the zero sideslip reduces drag. In addition, the required directional control is less demanding 
to sustain the flight condition. Lateral control margin is, however, reduced as no positive 
sideslip is available. 
 
5.1.2 Performance 
The simulation environment used for the analysis enabled a reconstruction of the maximum 
performance capabilities of the aircraft. The maximum performance capability indicates the 
aircraft climb capability, for the current condition, that is available with constant airspeed. The 
actual climb rate of the aircraft may not be equal to the maximum climb capability. In this 
condition the aircraft acceleration is not equal to zero. The maximum performance capability is 
calculated by differentiation of the aircraft’s specific energy6. Or: 
 
dh
dt
dH
dt
V
g
dV
dt
e
  *  
 
Where: 
 
dh
dt
e
= rate of change of specific energy (feet/min) 
dH
dt
 = altitude or climb rate (feet/min) 
dV
dt
 = acceleration along the flight path (feet/min
2
) 
g     = gravitational acceleration (feet/min2) 
 
5.2 Simulation environment 
The simulation environment for the analysis is based on the Delft University Aircraft 
Simulation Model and Analysis Tool DASMAT
7
. This MATLAB
®
/Simulink
®
 package was 
developed at the Division of Flight Control and Simulation of the Faculty of Aerospace 
Engineering of the Delft University of Technology in order to meet the requirements for 
computer assisted design (CAD) and evaluation of flight control systems. The software is 
equipped with several simulation and analysis tools, all centered around a generic nonlinear 
aircraft model for state-of-the-art six-degree-of-freedom aircraft simulations. For high 
performance computation and visualisation capabilities, the package has been integrated as a 
toolbox in the computing environment MATLAB
®
/Simulink
®
. Some of the features of the 
package include trimming and linearisation tools for linear flight control design, flight test data 
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analysis, nonlinear on-line or off-line 
simulations and 3D aircraft visualisation. 
Applying user-generated models to the generic 
package customizes the software for the 
simulation of any specific aircraft. The 
Simulink
®
 architecture of the software (figure 
10) comprises three generic models of the 
aircraft, engine and aerodynamics. The 
simulation environment for the accident 
analysis was developed as an extension 
module to the DASMAT package.  
The simulation environment incorporates a 
nonlinear aerodynamic model and a flight 
control system model, reflecting the hydraulic 
system architecture, of the accident aircraft. The modeled control surfaces were subjected to 
aerodynamic effects throughout the flight envelope. The environment is operated from its own 
operating shell. On-line simulations of the reconstructed model can be performed interactively 
or system failures can be selected that affect the aircraft’s flight mechanics. For the accident 
analysis, the simulation environment was extended to simulate separation of the right wing 
engines, incorporating all its associated system failures, and provided the capability to import 
DFDR pilot control inputs. In this setup, the reconstructed flight data was visualised in addition 
to any desired flight parameter that was not recorded by the DFDR. To account for the effect of 
the right wing damage, the aerodynamic model was extended with an estimate of the 
aerodynamic effects following the separation of the engines.  
 
5.2.1 Model requirements 
In general, analysis of impaired aircraft encountering one or more failure modes necessitates the 
definition of additional requirements to a simulation model of the aircraft. As impaired aircraft 
may introduce high nonlinear motions due to failures, the simulation model must comprise at 
least a nonlinear mathematical model in six-degrees-of-freedom. The requirements for the 
accident analysis resulted into the following model conditions and features for reconstruction 
and simulation: 
 
 Nonlinear aerodynamic model  
 Flight control system model 
 Simulation of engine separation and hydraulic failures  
 Provisions for failure mode and effect analysis 
 
Fig. 10: Model architecture of the simulation environment 
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 Simulation of all control surfaces subjected to mechanical and rate limits 
 Aerodynamic effects on the control surfaces to account for actuator force limitations in the 
case of hydraulic power loss, including floating control devices 
 Lateral control system including spoiler program 
 Directional control system that simulates the upper and lower rudder independently, 
including actuator forces and hinge moments 
 Dual yaw damper and dual ratio changer systems for failure mode conditions 
 Simulation of the hydraulic system architecture  
 JT9D-3 engine model modified to simulate the JT9D-7J high thrust version 
 Massmodel that accounts for fuel jettison 
 Process capability of DFDR data  
 Visualisation of flight parameters and control surface activity 
 User interface to select a desired failure mode or perform on-line simulations 
 
Modeling data was obtained from ref. [8-11]. 
 
5.2.2 Operating shell for DFDR analysis 
For the accident analysis, the simulation software was given the capability to reconstruct the 
DFDR data and to perform failure mode and effect analysis. The operating shell of the software 
(figure 11) offers several interactive capabilities for on-line simulations of the reconstructed 
model and analysis of the flight control system. The user may select a desired flight condition or 
specific failure mode scenario. Simulation results may then be recorded and used in conjunction 
with the analysis tools from DASMAT. This may, for instance, include the generation of a 
linearised model for flight control design applications. The operating shell offers the following 
capabilities for DFDR reconstruction and analysis of the reconstructed model: 
 
 Import of DFDR data 
 On-line simulation of aircraft, flight control and hydraulic systems 
 Selection of aircraft failure modes, including: 
- Engine separation 
- Hydraulic system failures 
 Visualisation of reconstructed flight data 
 Visualisation of reconstructed flight control surface deflections 
 3D visualisation of reconstructed flight profile 
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Fig. 11: Simulation environment for flight data reconstruction and analysis 
 
For the accident analysis, selection of engine separation will cause the simulation model to be 
configured according to the system architecture of the aircraft. 
 
5.3 Reconstruction setup 
The reconstruction is based on a model 
validation method using inverse 
simulation
12
 (figure 12). The DFDR pilot 
control inputs up are directly applied to 
the simulation model of the aircraft and 
the flight control system. The response 
error of the simulation output xc and 
measured DFDR data xm are input to a 
feedback controller. The output of the 
feedback controller is a measure for the 
fidelity of the reconstructed model. The 
reconstruction method has the advantage 
that the combined effect of structural and 
flight control system failures may be 
visualised using the simulation inputs and 
outputs. The estimation of the aerodynamic 
effects due to engine separation can be 
 FAILURE MODE 
SELECTION 
DFDR 
INPUT 
SIMULATION 
OUTPUT 
ON-LINE AIRCRAFT SIMULATION  
 
Fig. 13: Principle of Flight Data Reconstruction and Simulation 
(FDRS) for aircraft accident analysis 
 
 
Fig. 12: Inverse simulation principle for flight data reconstruction 
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performed by adjusting the parameters of a model structure of the damaged wing until the 
controller output is minimised. An additional advantage of the method is that the DFDR data, 
with a low sample rate, can be used directly to excite the simulation model. The reconstruction 
setup for the analysis is illustrated in figure 13. A proportional feedback controller using pitch 
and roll data proved to be sufficient to obtain a reasonable match with measurements and 
simulation data. 
 
The reconstructed flight profile of the accident aircraft, starting from lift-off to final loss of 
control, was divided into three separate stages or flight legs (figure 14): 
 
 
LEG#1 (t=47-371 sec):  
Gross takeoff flight path to engine separation.  
 
LEG#2 (t=378-647 sec): 
Engine separation flight path with flaps up.  
 
LEG#3 (t=648-874 sec):  
Engine separation flight path with flaps 1 
selected. 
 
 
This subdivision was based on the following considerations: 
 
 Validation of the simulation model and reconstruction method without failure modes 
 Estimation of aerodynamic effects for different aircraft configurations   
 Reduction of computational load 
 
Meteorological data at the time of the crash was used during the reconstruction. The effect of 
fuel jettison and fuel flow was included in the simulation based on DFDR data. To facilitate 
comparison, the time reference during the analysis was chosen the same as in ref. [2]. 
 
5.4 Aircraft configuration 
The aircraft failure mode configuration after the separation of the right wing engines (figure 15) 
was included in the simulation and consisted of: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14: Flight legs for DFDR reconstruction 
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Aircraft systems: 
 Hydraulic systems 3 and 4 off 
 Engine 1 and 2 thrust asymmetry 
 Lower rudder lag 
 
 Mass properties: 
 Engine no. 3 and 4 weight loss, 4,014 kg each 
 Pylon no. 3 and 4 weight loss,  1,000 kg each 
 Lateral center of gravity displacement 
 Total weight loss: 10,0028 kg 
 
Aerodynamics: 
 Lift loss due to wing damage, CLsep 
 Rolling moment due to wing damage, Clsep 
 Drag due to wing damage, CDsep 
 Yawing moment due to wing damage, Cnsep 
 Pitching moment due to wing damage, Cmsep 
 Right inboard aileron and spoiler 10 and 11  
aerodynamic efficiency loss 
 
 
 Fig. 15: Failure modes and damage 
 configuration of the accident aircraft 
 
6 Reconstruction and simulation results 
6.1 Aerodynamic effects 
On March 31, 1993, a Boeing 747 freighter encountered a separation of the no. 2 engine under 
turbulence conditions
13
. Despite the severe performance and controllability problems caused by 
the separated engine, the flight crew managed to recover the aircraft by means of an emergency 
landing. The flight conditions after engine separation required up to full right rudder pedal, 
approximately 60 degrees of right wing down control wheel deflection and overboost thrust on 
the no. 1 engine. The structural damage to the left wing of the aircraft (figure 16) may have been 
representative for the amount of structural damage incurred by the aircraft of the Bijlmermeer 
accident. 
The aerodynamic effects due to engine separation result in a lift loss and an increase of drag on 
the damaged wing. Consequently, an additional rolling moment due to lift loss and a yawing 
moment due to the drag increase on the wing will result. At higher angle of attack these effects 
Control surface lost 
50% Hinge moment loss / 
half trim rate 
 
  
-22- 
NLR-TP-2003-392 
 
  
 
 
 
will further increase resulting into a reduction of controllability and performance. Figure 17 
depicts an estimate of the right wing damage of the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer accident aircraft 
after the separation of the engines. The figure indicates that most damage of the right wing was 
located near the no. 3 engine. This may have caused a degradation of the aerodynamic 
efficiency of the inboard aileron located behind the damage. Additionally, the reconstruction 
method enabled to identify a significant pitch down moment effect after the separation of the 
engines. It is difficult to determine the individual contributions to this effect, as the exact 
damage to the right wing is not known. The effect was most probably caused by a combination 
of a change of induced downwash near the stabilizer, wing leading edge damage, effect of the 
engines and effect of selected flaps. An estimate of the additional pitch down moment was 
required to obtain a reasonable match with the DFDR data. 
 
Fig. 16: Wing damage due to separation of  Fig. 17: Estimated right wing damage                          
engine no.2, Boeing 747, March 31, 1993  of the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer accident 
(source: ref. [13]) aircraft  
 
Based on the estimates of damage to the right wing, a model structure of the aerodynamic 
effects due to engine separation was included in the simulation model for the reconstruction
3
. 
The aerodynamic estimates in the model, obtained during an extensive tuning process, resulted 
into a reasonable match with the performance and control capabilities of the accident aircraft. 
However, it should be emphasised that the aerodynamic effects due to structural failure, as 
characteristic for the accident flight, are very complex and difficult to determine precisely. This 
is especially true due to the fact that the actual amount of structural damage to the right wing 
was unknown. Therefore, the objective for the analysis was to obtain a physically representative 
model of the effect of engine separation on the aircraft flight mechanics by closely matching the 
characteristic trends in aircraft performance and controllability as provided by the flight data 
recorder. 
Figures 18-21 illustrate the effect of the aerodynamic estimates for the right wing damage 
contribution on the model input and output for t=378-647 s. It can be seen that, under the 
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prevailing flight condition, a reasonable match between DFDR and simulation for control wheel 
deflection (figures 18 and 19) and roll angle (figures 20 and 21) can be achieved.  
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Fig. 18: Reconstructed control wheel deflection without 
aerodynamic estimates (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 20: Reconstructed roll angle without aerodynamic 
estimates (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 19: Reconstructed control wheel deflection 
including aerodynamic estimates (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 21: Reconstructed roll angle including 
aerodynamic estimates (t=378-647 s) 
 
6.2 Flight data reconstruction 
The flight stages or legs of the accident profile, as defined for the analysis, were reconstructed 
starting from an initial trimmed flight condition in an aircraft configuration without failure 
modes. The trimmed condition was obtained by the aircraft trim routines in the simulation 
environment. At the start of the reconstruction, engines 3 and 4 were separated from the aircraft 
initiating all relevant failure modes in the simulation. Subsequently, the DFDR pilot control 
inputs were applied to the simulation model to reconstruct the relevant stage of the accident 
profile.  
The DFDR was recovered in a highly damaged state while the tape was broken on four places. 
To improve the quality of the DFDR data for simulation and analysis, the data was further 
analysed and smoothed before application. Reconstruction results of the accident flight are 
further discussed in ref. [3]. 
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Leg#1 (t=47-371 sec) 
Figures 22-35 illustrate the reconstruction results of the departure and climbout of the accident 
aircraft up to separation of the engines. The reconstructed data matches well with the DFDR 
data under the prevailing meteorological conditions. Performance capabilities and controllability 
of the simulation model are representative of the aircraft without failure modes and for the 
applied thrust settings. Ground track data (figure 22) was obtained from radar sources as this 
information was not available from the DFDR. The angle of attack bias in figure 31 is caused by 
the difference between measured and reconstructed angle of attack (DFDR vane angle of attack 
vs. calculated body angle of attack). 
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Fig. 22: Reconstructed ground track (t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 24: Reconstructed heading (t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 26: Reconstructed pitch angle (t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 23: Reconstructed altitude (t=47-371 s) 
 
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Time (s)
F
D
R
S
 S
id
e
s
lip
 A
n
g
le
 (
d
e
g
)
EL AL Flight 1862 Leg 1 / Pampus Departure
 
Fig. 25: Reconstructed sideslip angle (t=47- 
371 s) 
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Fig. 27: Reconstructed roll angle (t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 28: Reconstructed control column position 
(t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 30: Reconstructed indicated airspeed  
(t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 32: Reconstructed load factor (t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 34: DFDR applied power settings (t=47- 
371 s) 
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Fig. 29: Reconstructed control wheel deflection 
(t=47-371 s) 
 
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Time (s)
A
n
g
le
-o
f-
A
tt
a
c
k
 (
d
e
g
)
EL AL Flight 1862 Leg 1 / Pampus Departure
FDRS
DFDR
 
Fig. 31: Reconstructed angle of attack (t=47- 
371 s) 
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Fig. 33: Reconstructed longitudinal acceleration 
(t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 35: Reconstructed maximum climb capability 
(t=47-371 s) 
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Leg#2 (t=378-647 sec) 
Figures 36-49 present the reconstruction results of the accident flight after separation of the 
engines 3 and 4 up to the selection of flaps 1. The reconstructed data matches well with the 
DFDR data under the prevailing meteorological conditions. Among other parameters not 
available from the DFDR, the reconstruction method enabled to calculate the sideslip 
capabilities of the accident aircraft after the separation of the engines throughout the flight stage 
(figure 39). The figures indicate that performance capabilities and controllability of the 
simulation model for this flight condition are representative of the accident aircraft with flaps up 
and at high thrust.  
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Fig. 36: Reconstructed ground track (t=378- 
647 s) 
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Fig. 38: Reconstructed heading (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 40: Reconstructed pitch angle (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 37: Reconstructed altitude (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 39: Reconstructed sideslip angle (t=378- 
647 s) 
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Fig. 41: Reconstructed roll angle (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 42: Reconstructed control column position 
(t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 44: Reconstructed indicated airspeed (t=378-
647 s) 
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Fig. 46: Reconstructed load factor (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 48: DFDR applied power settings (t=378- 
647 s) 
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Fig. 43: Reconstructed control wheel deflection 
(t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 45: Reconstructed angle of attack (t=378- 
647 s) 
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Fig. 47: Reconstructed longitudinal acceleration  
(t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 49: Reconstructed maximum climb capability 
(t=378-647 s) 
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Leg#3 (t=648-874 sec) 
The reconstruction results of the accident flight after the selection of flaps 1 up to the final loss 
of control are shown in the figures 50-63. The reconstructed data shows a reasonable match with 
the DFDR data under the prevailing meteorological conditions. The difference between the 
impact area of the radar data and the simulation model (figure 50) is caused by the higher bank 
angle of the model from t=780 s to t=840 s and possible nonlinear effects at high angle of 
attack. In general, performance and control capabilities of the simulation model, up to the final 
stage of the flight, remain representative of the accident aircraft with inboard trailing edge flaps 
selected to 1 and for the applied thrust settings on the remaining engines. 
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Fig. 50: Reconstructed ground track (t=648- 
874 s) 
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Fig. 52: Reconstructed heading (t=648-874 s) 
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Fig. 54: Reconstructed pitch angle (t=648-874 s) 
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Fig. 51: Reconstructed altitude (t=648-874 s) 
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Fig. 53: Reconstructed sideslip angle (t=648- 
874 s) 
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Fig. 55: Reconstructed roll angle (t=648-874 s) 
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Fig. 56: Reconstructed control column position 
(t=648-874 s) 
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Fig. 58: Reconstructed indicated airspeed (t=648- 
874 s) 
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Fig. 60: Reconstructed load factor (t=648-874 s) 
 
 
660 680 700 720 740 760 780 800 820 840 860
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
1.45
1.5
1.55
1.6
1.65
Time (s)
E
n
g
in
e
 P
re
s
s
u
re
 R
a
ti
o
EL AL Flight 1862 Leg 3 / Flaps 1
Engine#1 EPR
Engine#2 EPR
 
Fig. 62: DFDR applied power settings (t=648- 
874 s) 
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Fig. 57: Reconstructed control wheel deflection 
(t=648-874 s) 
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Fig. 59: Reconstructed angle of attack (t=648- 
874 s) 
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Fig. 61: Reconstructed longitudinal acceleration  
(t=648-874 s) 
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Fig. 63: Reconstructed maximum climb capability 
(t=648-874 s) 
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6.3 Rudder control system analysis 
The simulation model of the flight control system enabled a reconstruction and analysis of the 
rudder deflections of the accident aircraft using the DFDR data. This analysis was performed to 
investigate the operation of the rudder control system during the accident flight in order to 
clarify certain anomalies that contributed adversely to the control of the aircraft. 
Reconstruction of the upper and lower rudder surface deflections, before the separation of the 
engines (t=47-371 s), indicated that reconstructed upper rudder deflection did not agree with the 
DFDR data (figure 64). Lower rudder activity was consistent with the DFDR lower rudder 
deflections (figure 65).  
At t=270 seconds, the aircraft acquires a 15 degrees roll angle to the left as a result of a control 
wheel input. Reconstructed upper rudder deflection is then opposite to the DFDR data. The 
lower rudder (figure 65) shows a reconstructed deflection consistent with the DFDR data and is 
opposite to the DFDR upper rudder deflection. For the upper rudder, several failure mode 
scenarios were applied to the simulation model. The model indicated that DFDR upper rudder 
activity can be reconstructed in case the upper rudder turn co-ordinator is not available (figure 
66). In this condition, figures 66 and 67 indicate that at t=270 seconds both reconstructed upper 
and lower rudder deflections are consistent with the DFDR data.  
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Fig. 64: Reconstructed upper rudder deflection 
(t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 66: Reconstructed upper rudder deflection 
(t=47-371 s); upper rudder turn coordinator not 
available 
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Fig. 65: Reconstructed lower rudder deflection 
(t=47-371 s) 
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Fig. 67: Reconstructed lower rudder deflection  
(t=47-371 s); upper rudder turn coordinator not 
available 
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Upper and lower rudder activity was subsequently evaluated after the separation of the engines 
(figures 68-73). The DFDR indicates that lower rudder authority was limited after the engines 
were separated from the aircraft (figure 68). To investigate the probable cause of this anomaly, 
rudder deflections were reconstructed for the second and third flight leg (t=378-874 s). It was 
found that deflections of the lower rudder, as indicated on the DFDR, were related to the flight 
condition at some stages. A typical effect starts at t=858 s when the aircraft loses flight control 
at full rudder pedal while bank angle increases. In this condition, at t=865 s, lower rudder 
deflection increases while upper rudder is limited and decreasing (figure 70).  
Both upper and lower rudders are equipped with a dual-tandem actuator. Loss of one actuator, 
due to loss of hydraulic supply, will reduce the actuator hinge moment. Under some flight 
conditions, the available rudder will thus be limited by actuator force capability (aerodynamic 
blowdown). To study this effect, additional failure mode scenarios were evaluated with the 
reconstructed model. An actuator hinge moment less than the nominal value, applied as a failure 
mode to the model of the lower rudder, appeared to most closely match the rudder deflection 
trends as observed on the DFDR. In this failure mode condition, when full pedal is applied at 
t=480 s, the reconstructed lower rudder deflections appear to be consistent with the DFDR data 
(figure 69). It can be seen that the lower rudder is limited to about 3.2 degrees, while upper 
rudder is limited to 7 degrees. Analysis of the reconstructed flight data indicated that the lower 
rudder deflections appear to be primarily subjected to the effect of sideslip due to thrust 
application (figure 72). In particular, this can be seen at t=590 s when engine no. 1 and 2 thrust 
is reduced which causes the sideslip to decrease resulting into an increase of lower rudder 
authority. For the condition after the loss of flight control, analysis of the simulation model 
indicated that the increase of lower rudder deflection at t=860 s (figure 70) was primarily caused 
by a reduction of the aerodynamic blowdown effect on the lower rudder as the aircraft banks to 
the right. As a consequence, lower rudder authority is increased enabling the rudder to follow a 
combination of the commanded pedal and yaw damper commands due to yaw rate (figure 73). 
Reconstructed rudder surface deflections for this condition are indicated in figure 71 (lower 
rudder simulated with blowdown limit of 5.1 degrees). 
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Fig. 68: DFDR upper and lower rudder deflections 
(t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 69: Reconstructed upper and lower rudder 
deflections (t=378-647 s) 
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Fig. 70: DFDR upper and lower rudder deflection 
(t=648-874 s) 
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Fig. 72: Reconstructed sideslip angle (t=378- 
647 s) 
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Fig. 71: Reconstructed upper and lower rudder 
deflections (t=648-874 s) 
 
660 680 700 720 740 760 780 800 820 840 860
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Time (s)
F
D
R
S
 Y
a
w
 D
a
m
p
e
r 
C
o
m
m
a
n
d
 (
d
e
g
)
EL AL Flight 1862 Leg 3 / Flaps 1
 
Fig. 73: Reconstructed lower rudder yaw damper  
command (t=648-874 s) 
 
6.4 Summary of simulation and analysis results 
The analysis results of the flight data reconstruction and simulation of the 1992 Amsterdam 
Bijlmermeer airplane accident case, as presented in ref. [3], can be summarised as follows: 
 
 The reconstructed model indicated that after separation of the engines from the aircraft, 
performance (figure 74) and controllability (figure 75) were degraded due to the heavy 
weight of the aircraft and additional drag of the damaged right wing. The relative large 
performance degradation at angles of attack greater than 8 degrees, at a load factor of 1.2 g, 
and at approximately 260 KIAS, could only be reconstructed by a significant increase of 
drag caused by the damaged wing. Application of thrust, combined with a delayed pedal 
input, resulted into a loss of flight control. 
 Analysis of the reconstructed model indicated that at the loss of flight control sufficient 
directional control margins existed to regain control of the aircraft.  
 The simulation model predicted that the control loss during the last flight stage was 
recoverable within operational limits (see appendix A). The control strategy for the recovery 
is, however, contradictory to the natural reaction of the pilot. The DFDR indicates that at 
final control loss, the engines are set at full thrust while the control column is pulled 
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backwards. In addition, less than maximum rudder pedal is applied at the initiation of 
control loss. The simulation model indicated that for a successful recovery, engine thrust 
must be reduced to idle, at the expense of performance, while applying full control wheel 
and rudder and a forward column deflection. Applying a control loss recovery strategy to 
the reconstructed model for the conditions during the final stage of flight, obtained the 
following results: 
 
- Altitude loss (t=858-880 s):  800 feet 
- Control recovery roll rate (48 degrees right to 20 degrees left bank):  7.6 deg/sec 
- Maximum performance loss:  -3500 feet/min 
- Application of maximum thrust (EPR 1.62 / EGT limit):  20 seconds 
 
 The reconstructed model was able to identify that upper rudder turn coordinator was not 
available before the separation of the engines. It is not likely that this condition contributed 
to the separation of the no. 3 engine.  
 With regard to the lower rudder lag after the separation of the engines, the simulation model 
indicated that a reasonable match with DFDR lower rudder deflections could be obtained by 
applying a reduction of lower rudder actuator hinge moment as a failure mode. Although the 
analysis indicated that the lower rudder lag had a significant adverse contribution to the 
control of the aircraft (figure 76), no statement could be made with regard to the origin of 
this failure mode.  
 Analysis of the reconstructed model indicated that straight and level flight capability existed 
down to approximately 250 KIAS at heavy weight and go-around thrust (figure 77). A 
weight reduction of about 56,000 kg reduced the straight and level flight capabilities down 
to approximately 220 KIAS at MCT. Weight reduction was achieved by simulation of fuel 
jettison up to a remaining quantity for about 20 minutes of flight. A deceleration to 240 
KIAS could be simulated for straight flight only at heavy weight and MCT thrust. 
 The reconstructed model indicated that after the separation of the engines controllability 
was sufficient to turn in both directions. 
 The simulation model predicts sufficient performance and controllability after the 
separation of the engines to fly a low-drag approach profile at a 3.5 degrees glide slope 
angle for a high-speed landing or ditch at 200/210 KIAS (figure 78). The lower thrust 
requirement for this approach profile resulted into a significant improvement of 
controllability (figure 79). Performance and controllability for this condition were 
calculated for a weight reduction of 56,000 kg due to fuel jettison. Further speed reduction 
below approximately 220 KIAS at flaps 1 resulted in a loss of go-around capabilities. 
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Fig. 74: Effect of engine thrust and weight on 
maximum climb performance for straight flight at 
260 KTS  
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Fig. 76: Effect of lower rudder lag on lateral 
control for straight and level flight at 250 KTS 
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Fig. 78: Effect of weight on indicated airspeeds 
and attainable flight path angles for simulated 
low-drag approach profile 
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Fig. 75: Effect of engine thrust and weight on 
lateral control for straight flight at 260 KTS 
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Fig. 77: Effect of weight on lateral control for 
straight and level flight at 250 KTS 
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Fig. 79: Effect of weight on lateral control and 
attainable flight path angles for simulated low-
drag approach profile 
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7 Conclusions and recommendations 
7.1 Conclusions 
Based on the results of the analysis in this report the following conclusions can be made. 
 
 An independent analysis of the 1992 Amsterdam Bijlmermeer airplane accident, performed 
at the Division of Flight Control and Simulation of the Faculty of Aerospace Engineering of 
the Delft University of Technology in 1997, was presented. Utilising modeling and 
simulation techniques, referred to as Flight Data Reconstruction and Simulation (FDRS), a 
reconstruction of the accident flight was performed using the parameters of the Digital 
Flight Data Recorder (DFDR). The reconstructed model was used to estimate the actual 
flying capabilities of the aircraft using several flight control strategies. 
 The reconstruction method, developed for the accident analysis, proved to be a practical tool 
to obtain a reasonable match with the DFDR data of the accident flight given the limited 
estimations of the aircraft’s structural damage. The application of this technique resulted 
into a simulation model of the impaired aircraft that could reasonably predict the 
performance, controllability effects and control surface deflections as observed on the 
DFDR. 
 The analysis software provided the tools for a detailed estimate of the flying capabilities of 
the aircraft. This included an analysis of several flight control system related problems that 
contributed adversely to the control of the aircraft. Analysis of the rudder control system 
indicated a possible degradation of hinge moment capabilities of the lower rudder after 
separation of the engines. Although it was shown that this had a significant adverse effect 
on controllability, no conclusions could be made with regard to the cause of this failure 
mode. 
 Analysis of the reconstructed model using several control strategies indicated that from a 
technical point of view the accident aircraft was recoverable. However, the required 
procedures evaluated for the recovery are not part of current industry training practices for 
complex in-flight emergencies or handling qualities in degraded modes. It is therefore 
understandable that a successful recovery of the aircraft under the prevailing conditions was 
highly improbable. 
 
7.2 Recommendations 
The following general recommendations can be made as far as the aircraft accident case and 
described investigation techniques are concerned. 
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 For aircraft control in case of a degradation of performance and controllability, the analysis 
indicates that: 
- Control of the aircraft should have a first priority. 
- If control of the aircraft can still be maintained, time should be used for an assessment 
of the remaining performance and control capabilities and, where necessary, try to 
improve it (e.g. jettison of fuel). 
- Unusual attitude recovery techniques may be required to regain control of the aircraft. 
- Configuration changes (e.g. flaps and landing gear) should be kept to a minimum.  
- Special care should be given to airspeed and angle of attack in degraded flight 
conditions. Further degradation of performance and controllability may be expected at 
the reduction of airspeed and increase of angle of attack. For an emergency landing in 
these conditions, higher than nominal approach speeds should be considered. The 
selection of flaps should not be considered. 
- Awareness of the pilot regarding performance and controllability limits in a (severely) 
degraded flight condition may increase the survivability of the aircraft. Methods for in-
flight failure accommodation may assist the pilot in flying the aircraft or function as an 
advisory by providing information concerning the (degraded) flight envelope. 
- Apart from training of multiple system failures, flight crews should be more 
familiarised with conditions in which the performance and controllability of the aircraft 
are compromised. This includes demonstration of aircraft control and the application of 
thrust in degraded (asymmetric) modes as part of standard training practices. 
 The presented modeling and simulation techniques may be used as a practical tool for 
reconstruction and simulation of vehicle and system dynamics under specific failure mode 
conditions in case operational recorded data is available. Depending on the application, the 
applied methods and simulation techniques may be modified or developed further. 
 For the application of flight data for accident investigation purposes, the quality of DFDR 
data should be further improved. Specifically, to make recorded vehicle data more suitable 
for computer processing, simulation and analysis, the sample rate of the data should be as 
high as possible. 
 The reconstructed model of the accident aircraft may be further used as a research tool to 
evaluate advanced flight control techniques on their performance to accommodate in-flight 
failures.  
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Appendix A 3D visualisation of the accident flight 
The figures on the following pages demonstrate the 3D-visualisation capabilities of the analysis 
software as used for reconstruction of the accident flight. A 3D profile of the reconstructed 
flight from takeoff up to the final stage of flight is illustrated in the figures a-k. Figures l-o show 
a 3D visualisation of a control loss recovery strategy applied to the reconstructed model. 
Simulation was performed using the on-line analysis capabilities of the simulation environment. 
a) t=137 s: Initial climb after takeoff b) t=367 s: Separation engines no. 3 and 4 
c) t=443 s: Right turn / high performance  d) t=618 s: High thrust / low climb capability 
degradation 
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e) t=648 s: Flaps 1 selected / MCT thrust f) t=708 s: Heading 120 
g) t=768 s: Final turn / start of performance h) t=788 s: Loss of lateral control margins 
degradation 
i) t=808 s: High performance degradation j) t=848 s: Application of thrust / loss of flight  
  control 
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k) t=863 s: Engines no. 1 and 2 at full thrust / flight control lost 
l) Control loss recovery strategy m) Control loss recovery strategy 
t=859 s: Power levers idle / column forward t=869 s: Left bank / maximum thrust 
n) Control loss recovery strategy o) Control loss recovery strategy 
t=890 s: Altitude recovery / TOGA thrust t=1004 s: Steady climb / MCT thrust 
 
